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Hacking Alice’s box in continuous variable quantum key distribution
Jason Pereira, Stefano Pirandola
Computer Science and York Centre for Quantum Technologies, University of York, York YO10 5GH, UK
Security analyses of quantum cryptographic protocols typically rely on certain conditions; one
such condition is that the sender (Alice) and receiver (Bob) have isolated devices inaccessible to
third parties. If an eavesdropper (Eve) has a side-channel into one of the devices, then the key rate
may be sensibly reduced. In this paper, we consider an attack on a coherent-state protocol, where
Eve not only taps the main communication channel but also hacks Alice’s device. This is done by
introducing a Trojan horse mode with low mean number of photons n¯ which is then modulated in
a similar way to the signal state. First we show that this strategy can be reduced to an attack
without side-channels but with higher loss and noise in the main channel. Then we show how the
key rate rapidly deteriorates for increasing photons n¯, being halved at long distances each time n¯+1
doubles. Our work suggests that Alice’s device should also be equipped with sensing systems that
are able to detect and estimate the total number of incoming and outgoing photons.
I. INTRODUCTION
Quantum information science [1–3] is advancing at a
rapid pace. The progress of quantum computing [4]
threatens to make current, classical cryptography inse-
cure. Quantum key distribution (QKD) [5–7] is a possi-
ble solution to this problem, offering provable informa-
tion security based on physical principles. It is possible to
design QKD protocols that ensure that any eavesdropper
can hold only an arbitrarily small amount of information
about the message sent. This holds true regardless of
how advanced the eavesdropper’s technology is.
Security proofs for QKD protocols have a few assump-
tions that must hold in order for them to be valid [8].
The two trusted parties (Alice and Bob) must have iso-
lated devices, which are inaccessible to the eavesdropper
(Eve). The devices should be fully characterised, so that
an adversary cannot exploit device imperfections to ac-
quire information about the key or to alter the trusted
parties’ estimations of the quantum channel properties.
The trusted parties must also have an authenticated (but
not secure) classical channel; an eavesdropper can listen
in to classical communications along this channel, but
cannot alter them. If we relax any of these conditions,
the secure key rate for a protocol may change.
Current commercial implementations of discrete vari-
able (DV) protocols, such as BB84 [9] with decoy states
[10, 11], have been shown to be vulnerable to a variety of
attacks that exploit device imperfections, such as “side-
channels” that leak information from the trusted parties’
devices to Eve [12]. These attacks include detector blind-
ing attacks [13], time-shift attacks [14] and Trojan horse
attacks [15].
A variety of attacks on continuous variable (CV) proto-
cols have been proposed. In experimental realisations of
QKD, the local oscillator (which is used by Bob to carry
out his measurements) is often sent down the quantum
channel; this introduces a vulnerability that an eaves-
dropper can exploit. Ha¨seler et al. [16] demonstrated
that Eve could disguise an intercept and resend attack
by replacing the signal state and the local oscillator with
squeezed states. The wavelength-dependence of beam-
splitters in Bob’s setup can be exploited to engineer his
measurement outcomes [17, 18]. Altering the shape of
the local oscillator pulse can allow an eavesdropper to
change Bob’s estimation of the shot-noise [19, 20]. Satu-
ration attacks [21, 22], which push Bob’s detectors out of
the linear mode of operation, have also been proposed.
One way of avoiding attacks that exploit device im-
perfections is to use device-independent QKD [8, 23].
This is a family of protocols that do not require Al-
ice’s and Bob’s devices to be trusted. Such protocols
are immune from many side-channel attacks, but have
significantly lower key rates than protocols that require
trusted devices. Measurement-device independent (MDI)
QKD protocols have been formulated for both the DV
[24, 25] and the CV [26] cases, and have much higher
key rates than fully device-independent protocols. MDI-
QKD removes threats from the detector’s point of view,
but still assumes that the state-preparation devices are
completely trusted. Therefore, MDI-QKD is also subject
to the quantum hacking described in this paper.
Here we consider a Trojan horse attack, where Eve
sends extra photons into Alice’s device, in order to gain
information about the states being sent through the main
quantum channel without disturbing the signal state.
This type of attack was first considered in depth by
Vakhitov et al. [27]. Such an attack may be used in DV
protocols [28], in order to distinguish decoy states from
signal states or to gain information about Alice’s basis
choice.
Gisin et al. [29] described how reflectometry could be
used by Eve to gain information about Alice’s phase mod-
ulator settings and analytically calculated the informa-
tion leakage in terms of the photon number of the state
received by Eve after the side-channel. They assumed at-
tenuation of the side-channel mode by Alice and showed
that the information leakage is reduced if Alice can ran-
domise the phase of the side-channel mode.
Lucamarini et al. [30] calculated the secret key rate for
BB84, with and without decoy states, in the presence of
a Trojan horse side-channel, in terms of the photon num-
ber of the state received by Eve. They then bounded the
2incoming photon number in terms of the Laser Induced
Damage Threshold (LIDT) of the optical fibre and the
time for which Alice’s device gate is open, assuming that
the Trojan horse photons are sent in via the main chan-
nel, whilst the gate is open. Based on this constraint,
they designed an architecture to passively limit the pho-
ton number of the received state, and hence the informa-
tion leakage.
Tamaki et al. [31] found general analytical expressions
for the information leakage of DV protocols due to Trojan
horse attacks, in terms of the actions of the phase and
intensity modulators. This allows the secret key rate of
a general DV protocol in the presence of a Trojan horse
side-channel to be calculated, as long as the phase and
intensity modulators are well-characterised.
Here we assume a CV protocol based on the modula-
tion of coherent states [32], so that the attack is against
the modulator. The experimental viability of carrying
out a Trojan horse attack on the commercial CV system
SeQureNet has previously been considered [33].
More precisely we assume that Eve is both hacking
Alice’s device with n¯ mean photons per run and tap-
ping the main quantum channel between Alice and Bob,
which can be assumed to be a thermal-loss channel. This
joint eavesdropping strategy can be reduced to a side-
channel-free attack but where the main quantum chan-
nel has higher loss and noise. In this way we can com-
pute the secret key rate and how it varies in terms of the
mean photons n¯. In particular, we show that, at long
distances, the key rate is halved each time n¯+1 doubles.
This means that inserting just a few hacking photons into
Alice’s setup can seriously endanger the security of the
protocol. As a result of our analysis, we conclude that
the presence of these extra photons should be actively
monitored in any practical implementation of CV QKD.
II. RESULTS
A. General scenario
We consider two parties, Alice and Bob, who are try-
ing to establish a secret key, with a third party, Eve,
trying to gain information about the secret key. Alice
initiates a coherent state protocol [32, 34]. This involves
her displacing a vacuum state by a Gaussian-distributed
random (two-dimensional) variable, α. In real implemen-
tations, this displacement is generally carried out by in-
dependently modulating the phase and the intensity, so
that the overall displacement has a Gaussian distribu-
tion. She then sends the displaced vacuum state (called
the signal state) to Bob, via a quantum channel. Bob
then carries out a heterodyne measurement on the sig-
nal state, to obtain a value β. This process is repeated
several times. Alice and Bob compare some of their val-
ues via a classical communication channel in order to
establish the transmittance, η, and excess noise, ϵ, of the
channel. Bob and Alice then establish a secret key based
on their shared knowledge of Bob’s values (this is called
reverse reconciliation).
Whilst the signal states are in the main quantum chan-
nel, we allow Eve to enact any unitary operation upon
them. We assume that Eve can listen in on all classical
communication between Alice and Bob (but cannot alter
it). She can then store all states involved in the opera-
tion (except for the signal state) in a quantum memory
and carry out an optimal measurement on them after
all quantum and classical communication has been com-
pleted, in order to gain information about Bob’s values.
Alice and Bob therefore assume that all of the noise and
loss of the channel has been caused by Eve’s unitary op-
erations and try to bound the maximum knowledge that
Eve could have obtained about Bob’s values. As long as
Alice has more information about Bob’s values than Eve,
it is possible for Alice and Bob to obtain a secret key.
If Eve is only able to access the main channel and is
not able to access Alice or Bob’s devices in any way, the
optimal attack on the signal state for a given attenuation
and noise is an entangling cloner [35]. The secret key rate
for this case has been calculated [36]. Here we instead
consider the case where Eve also has access to part of
Alice’s device via a side-channel. Eve can send a Trojan
horse mode into Alice’s device, which will be displaced
by α in the same way as the signal state. This side-
channel mode contains an average number of photons n¯,
and we assume that Alice is able to monitor these pho-
tons and estimate their number. This will not be the
case for most current CV-QKD implementations, espe-
cially since certain potential Trojan horse side-channels
may not have been identified yet, so additional quantum
metrological tools must be placed inside Alices box in
order for this assumption to be met. To represent Eve’s
Trojan horse mode, we assume it is part of a two-mode
squeezed vacuum (TMSV) state [34] with squeezing r, so
that n¯ = sinh2 r. This is an active attack when n¯ > 0
and it is a passive one when n¯ = 0, meaning that we just
have a leakage mode from Alice’s device.
Recently, a side-channel on CV-QKD based on leakage
from a multimode modulator was considered by Derkach
et al. [37], building on their previous work [38]. These
works considered leakage modes prior to and after mod-
ulation of the signal state, for both the coherent state and
the squeezed state protocols. However, these authors did
not consider side-channels that allow Eve to send pho-
tons into Alice’s device (non-zero values of n¯). They also
considered homodyne, rather than heterodyne, measure-
ments by the receiver. In this paper, we will consider a
more general scenario, where the hacking of Alice’s device
is active, therefore involving the use of two-mode squeez-
ing, so that n¯ > 0 photons enter the device. We analyse
the security when the side-channel mode is modulated by
α, exactly as the signal mode is (we later generalise to
the case where its modulation is mα). See Fig. 1 for an
overview of the situation.
To find the secret key rate in reverse reconciliation, we
need to calculate the mutual information between Alice
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FIG. 1: The channel setup under consideration. A is Alice’s
device, B is Bob’s device and E is Eve’s device. The dashed
green line marks the part of Alice’s device that is accessible to
Eve. Eve sends one mode of a TMSV state into Alice’s device
to be displaced by α in the same way as the signal state. Alice
knows the average photon number, n¯, of Eve’s state. The
(displaced) squeezed vacuum modes and the signal state form
the state ψ0. Eve enacts a unitary on this total state and any
ancillary modes, then sends the signal state to Bob and stores
the remaining modes in a quantum memory. Bob carries out
a heterodyne measurement on the signal state, obtaining β.
We find the key rate assuming that the main channel is a
thermal channel, with transmittance η and excess noise ϵ, as
represented by the blue dashed arrow.
and Bob I(α : β) and that between Eve and Bob. The
latter is upper-bounded by the Holevo bound I(E : β),
which can be calculated as the reduction in entropy of
Eve’s output state when conditioned by Bob’s value, β.
We upper-bound Eve’s knowledge of Bob’s state by as-
suming that all noise and loss experienced by the signal
state is due to Eve enacting unitary operations on the
signal state and some ancillary modes, which are then
stored in a quantum memory.
B. Reduction of the attack
If there are no side-channels, Eve’s Holevo bound can
be calculated by assuming that the signal state is entan-
gled with some state held by Alice, and that α is the re-
sult of a heterodyne measurement on a TMSV state [35].
In the presence of our side-channel, the initial state held
by Eve prior to her enacting the main channel is tripartite
and composed of the signal mode and Eve’s side-channel
modes. Our first step must be to determine the first and
second moments of this state ψ0 (see Fig. 1). We label
the initial first moment vector X0 and the initial second
moment (covariance) matrix V0. For a fixed value of α,
we have the conditional state ψ0|α which is the tensor
product of a coherent state |α⟩ ⟨α| and a TMSV state
where one of the modes has also been displaced by α.
The conditional moments are given by
X0|α =

αα
0

 , V0|α =

1 0 00 cosh 2r1 sinh 2rZ
0 sinh 2rZ cosh 2r1

 , (1)
where 1 is the one-mode identity matrix, 0 is the one-
mode zero-matrix, and Z is the Pauli Z-matrix.
In order to find the elements of V0, we add the expec-
tation value of X0|α ·X0|αT to V0|α. Using ⟨α⟩ = 0 and⟨
α2
⟩
= µ, we find
X0 =

00
0

 , V0 =

(µ+ 1)1 µ1 0µ1 (µ+ cosh 2r)1 sinh 2rZ
0 sinh 2rZ cosh 2r1

 .
(2)
From the covariance matrix V0 we can compute the three
symplectic eigenvalues [34]
v1 = 1, (3)
v2 = µ+
√
1 + µ+ µ2 + µ cosh 2r, (4)
v3 = −µ+
√
1 + µ+ µ2 + µ cosh 2r, (5)
and compute the entropy of the total state as [34]
S(ψ0) =
∑3
k=1 g(vk) where [40]
g(x) =
x+ 1
2
log2
x+ 1
2
− x− 1
2
log2
x− 1
2
(6)
x≫1→ log2
ex
2
+O(x−1). (7)
The fact that v1 = 1 tells us that there is a symplectic
transformation that reduces ψ0 to a tensor product of a
two-mode state and a vacuum state. We can build on this
observation and reduce the number of modes. In fact, we
may show the reduction to the setup in Fig. 2, which only
involves the signal mode, modulated by k1α (with k1 >
1), and a single Trojan horse mode, modulated by k2Zα
(with k2 real). We can design a Gaussian unitary U˜ that
converts the initial state ψ0 from Fig. 1 into the initial
state ψ3 from Fig. 2. This unitary operation U˜ is the
optical circuit shown in Fig. 3, where we have labelled the
signal state as ψB , Eve’s squeezed state that enters the
side-channel as ψE1 and Eve’s idler state (the squeezed
state that does not enter the side-channel) as ψE2.
To see how the circuit transforms the state, we examine
it after each of the three optical components; we label the
states after each component with the subscripts 1, 2 and
3. ψi has first moments vector Xi and covariance matrix
Vi. The conditional state ψi|α is associated to Xi|α and
Vi|α. The symplectic matrix of the ith component is Si
and it characterises the transformation of the state from
ψi−1 to ψi as follows: Vi = SiVi−1STi and Xi = SiXi−1.
The first component is a balanced beamsplitter, acting
on the signal state and Eve’s side-channel mode. This
sets the quadratures for Eve’s side-channel mode to 0. It
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FIG. 2: An equivalent channel to the setup in Fig. 1. Alice
draws a two-dimensional variable, α, from a Gaussian distri-
bution then displaces one vacuum state by k1α and another
by k2Zα. The first mode is sent through the main channel to
Bob as the signal state and the second mode is leaked to Eve.
The equivalence can be seen from the fact that Eve can get
the initial state from Fig. 1, ψ0, by enacting the unitary U˜
−1,
and can then enact the same arbitrary unitary, U . We can
regard this as Eve enacting a single combined unitary, U ′.
has symplectic matrix
S1 =


1√
2
1
1√
2
1 0
− 1√
2
1
1√
2
1 0
0 0 1

 , (8)
and it results in the following moments for ψ1|α and ψ1
X1|α =


√
2α
0
0

 , (9)
V1|α =


cosh2 r1 sinh2 r1 sinh 2r√
2
Z
sinh2 r1 cosh2 r1 sinh 2r√
2
Z
sinh 2r√
2
Z
sinh 2r√
2
Z cosh 2r1

 , (10)
V1 = V1|α⊕ 2µ

1 0
0

 . (11)
The second component is a two-mode squeezer, oper-
ating on Eve’s modes such that one of them becomes
a vacuum state. Its squeezing parameter is given by
r2 = log
(√
2 cosh r−sinh r√
cosh2 r+1
)
, and it has symplectic matrix
S2 =


1 0 0
0
√
2 cosh r√
cosh2 r+1
1 − sinh r√
cosh2 r+1
Z
0 − sinh r√
cosh2 r+1
Z
√
2 cosh r√
cosh2 r+1
1

 . (12)
The moments of ψ2|α and ψ2 are given by
X2|α =


√
2α
0
0

 , (13)
V2|α =

 cosh
2 r1 0
√
cosh4 r − 1Z
0 1 0√
cosh4 r − 1Z 0 cosh2 r1

 , (14)
V2 = V2|α⊕ 2µ

1 0
0

 . (15)
Note that one of the modes has become a vacuum state.
Henceforth, we neglect this mode and implicitly enact
the identity operation on it. We now see that, for fixed
α, the system is a displaced TMSV state. The third
component undoes the squeezing, leaving us with two
displaced vacuum states. Its squeezing parameter is given
by r3 = − arcsinh
(
sinh r√
2
)
and it has symplectic matrix
S3 =


√
cosh2 r+1√
2
1 − sinh r√
2
Z
− sinh r√
2
Z
√
cosh2 r+1√
2
1

 . (16)
The moments of ψ3|α and ψ3 are
X3|α =
(
k1α
k2Zα
)
, V3|α =
(
1 0
0 1
)
, (17)
V3 =
(
(1 + µ(cosh2 r + 1))1 −µ
√
cosh4 r − 1Z
−µ
√
cosh4 r − 1Z (1 + µ sinh2 r)1
)
,
(18)
where we have set
k1 :=
√
cosh2 r + 1, k2 := − sinh r. (19)
This conclude the proof of equivalence between the setups
in Fig. 1 and Fig. 2.
We note that the two components (quadratures) of α
are uncorrelated with each other and have the same vari-
ance. Let us also assume that the two quadratures of
Bob’s outcome (β) are also uncorrelated with each other
and have the same variance. This is certainly the case in
the presence of a thermal-loss channel, characterised by a
transmittance η and an excess noise ϵ, which is the most
typical scenario in QKD. Next, we show that the setup
in Fig. 2 has the same key rate as the setup in Fig. 4,
in which the signal mode is modulated by k1α and the
side-channel mode is modulated by k2α (rather than by
k2Zα). Note that in Fig. 4, we have also imposed that
the general unitary results in a thermal-loss channel.
Since we assume that the main channel does not mix
the quadratures, we can treat the two quadratures of
α, which we denote as αx and αp, as independent vari-
ables that have been sent through the channel and mea-
sured to give the independent variables βx and βp re-
spectively. Let IxAB (I
p
AB) denote the mutual information
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FIG. 3: A circuit that converts the initial (pre-main channel)
state from the setup in Fig. 1 into the initial state from the
setup in Fig. 2. This shows that the two channel setups have
the same key rate, since Eve can enact any unitary operation
and hence is able to convert one into the other. We label
this entire circuit U˜ . Eve can also enact the inverse, U˜−1.
ψB denotes the signal state, ψE1 denotes Eve’s squeezed state
that enters the side-channel and ψE2 denotes Eve’s idler state.
BS1 is a balanced beamsplitter and Sq2 and Sq3 are two-mode
squeezers. BS1 moves all of the displacement onto the first
mode, such that Eve’s states are no longer displaced, Sq
2
unsqueezes Eve’s states such that one of the modes becomes
a pure vacuum state and Sq
3
unsqueezes the signal state and
Eve’s remaining mode such that they become pure displaced
vacuum states.
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FIG. 4: An alternative channel setup that must give the same
secret key rate as the setup in Fig. 2 assuming the presence of
a thermal-loss channel. The difference between the two setups
is that in Fig. 2, the x-quadrature of Eve’s side-channel state
is modulated by k2αx and the p-quadrature is modulated by
−k2αp; in this figure,the x-quadrature is still modulated by
k2αx but the p-quadrature is modulated by k2αp. Since the
two quadratures encode independent variables and since the
x-quadrature is not affected by the change, the mutual infor-
mations arising from the measurement of the x-quadrature,
IxAB and I
x
EB , must be the same in each setup and hence
the key rates must be the same. We assume that Eve beam-
splits the signal state with some thermal state with variance
ω. This specific representation of Eve’s unitary is unique up
to isometries on her output ancillas. In other words, if we fix
the channel to be thermal-loss, then its dilation into a beams-
splitter with an environmental thermal state is fixed up to
unitaries acting over Eve’s entire output Hilbert space [39].
between Alice and Bob arising from the measurement of
the x-quadrature (p-quadrature) and let IxEB (I
p
EB) de-
note the maximum mutual information between Eve and
Bob arising from the measurement of the x-quadrature
(p-quadrature). Since the x and p quadratures of α and
β are independent and identically distributed, IAB and
IEB are double I
x
AB and I
x
EB respectively.
Let I ′AB , I
′x
AB , I
′
EB and I
′x
EB be the counterparts of
IAB , I
x
AB , IEB and I
x
EB respectively for the setup in
Fig. 4. It is again true that I ′AB and I
′
EB are double I
′x
AB
and I ′xEB respectively. Further, since the quadratures are
independent and the x-quadratures of Eve’s states are
not affected by the change in setup (the only difference
is that the p-quadrature of Eve’s side-channel mode is
modulated by k2αp rather than by −k2αp), IxAB must be
the same as I ′xAB . This means that IAB is the same as
I ′AB and IEB is the same as I
′
EB . Note that this holds
for all channels (not just thermal channels) that do not
mix the quadratures and so the Z matrix in Fig. 2 can
be neglected for any such channel.
Hence, the setup in Fig. 4 must give the same key rate
as the setup in Fig. 2, and therefore the setup in Fig. 1.
The setup in Fig. 4 is equivalent to a main channel setup
with a higher initial modulation and a lower effective
transmittance. The equivalent main channel attack is
shown in Fig. 5. The signal state is modulated by kα,
where
k =
√
k21 + k
2
2 =
√
2 cosh r =
√
2(n¯+ 1), (20)
and hence the modulation amplitude is k2µ. k is a func-
tion of n¯, which characterises the side-channel. We note
that k1 and k2 are functions only of n¯. By choosing an
appropriate parameter for the beamsplitter in Fig. 5, Eve
can get the initial state of Fig. 4. We then effect a ther-
mal channel by beamsplitting with the thermal state with
parameter ω. We can reduce both operations to a single
beamsplitter operation with some other thermal state ω′
(see Fig. 6).
This allows us to calculate the key rate in the same
way as a main channel attack but with a higher “effective
modulation amplitude”, µ′, and a lower “effective trans-
mittance”, η′. These effective parameters (the channel
parameters that the trusted parties would calculate for
the setup in Fig. 5) are related to the measured values of
µ and η by
µ′ = k2µ, η′ =
η
k2
. (21)
The effective transmittance accounts for both beamsplit-
ters and is the transmittance that we would observe if,
instead of a setup with a signal state modulated by µ and
a side-channel (as seen in Fig. 1), we had a setup with a
signal state modulated by µ′ and no side-channel, with
the same measured values of β (as seen in Fig. 5). This
was found by multiplying the transmissions of the two
beamsplitters in Fig. 5.
It is helpful to clarify the definition of the excess noise,
ϵ. To do so, we introduce the random variable n: this is
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FIG. 5: This is a setup without a side-channel that must give
the same secret key rate as the setup with the side-channel.
The variance of Alice’s variable in this setup is higher than
the actual variance of α, and the channel transmittance for
this setup is lower than the observed channel transmittance,
η. The channel for this setup can be regarded as a thermal
channel with parameters η′ and ϵ′ (represented by the blue,
dashed arrow).
the total relative input noise of β around α, including the
vacuum noise. We can describe β in terms of n as β =
η(α + n). Here n is characterised by its second moment⟨
n2
⟩
= 1+(1−η)/η+ϵ. We now find the effective excess
noise, ϵ′ (as would be observed for the setup in Fig. 5),
using the fact that we have the same measured β values
in all representations. β can be expressed in terms of
effective parameters as β = η′(kα+n′), where the second
moment of n′ is now given by
⟨
n′2
⟩
= 1+(1−η′)/η′+ ϵ′.
We then substitute in the definition of η′ and compare
the expressions for β, and so solve for ϵ′, i.e.,
ϵ′ =
η
η′
ϵ = k2ϵ. (22)
C. Computation of the key rate
To calculate the secret key rate for a main channel
attack with a modulation amplitude of µ′, a transmit-
tance of η′ and an excess noise of ϵ′, we can use an
entanglement-based representation (rather than a pre-
pare and measure representation) [35]. This representa-
tion is shown in Fig. 6, and is valid as long as µ > 0.
Alice heterodynes one mode of a TMSV state, obtain-
ing the value kα˜ (and hence also the value of α) and
preparing the state ρ(kα). She then sends the prepared
signal state through the channel to Bob, who hetero-
dynes it to obtain β. In the channel, the signal state is
beamsplit with the thermal state ρth(ω). The total state
shared by Alice, Bob and Eve, which we denote ρABE ,
is pure since Eve holds the purification of the channel.
This means that the entropy of Eve’s state, ρE , is equal
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FIG. 6: This is the entanglement-based representation of the
attack in Fig. 5. Alice heterodynes one half of a TMSV state
to get the value kα˜, which linearly corresponds to kα (the
displacement of the signal state). The signal state enters the
channel and is subject to some thermal noise due to beam-
splitting with one mode of an entangling cloner (the thermal
state ω′). It is then heterodyned by Bob, to obtain β. The
resultant state of Alice, Bob and Eve is pure. The channel
between Alice and Bob is a thermal channel, characterised by
η′ and ϵ′; this is represented by the blue, dashed arrow.
to the entropy of the combined state of Alice and Bob,
ρAB . The combined state of Alice and Eve conditioned
by some value of β, ρAE |β, is also pure, so the entropy
of Eve’s state conditioned by β, ρE |β, is equal to the
entropy of Alice’s state conditioned by β, ρA|β.
The covariance matrix of ρAB is
VAB =
(
(µ′ + 1)1
√
η′µ′(µ′ + 2)Z√
η′µ′(µ′ + 2)Z (η′(µ′ + ϵ′) + 1)1
)
, (23)
the covariance matrices of the conditional states ρA|β
and ρB |α are given by
VA|β =
(
µ′ + 1− η
′µ′(µ′ + 2)
η′(µ′ + ϵ′) + 2
)
1, (24)
VB |α = (η′ϵ′ + 1)1. (25)
We can calculate the symplectic eigenvalues of VAB using
the formula in [34]. The expressions for these eigenvalues
can be simplified by taking the asymptotic limit in µ
(the limit as µ → ∞). In this limit, µ′ → ∞ and all
other parameters stay the same. We assume that η′ ≤
1, since realistically, Eve will not enact a main channel
that causes gain rather than loss. We denote the two
symplectic eigenvalues of VAB in this limit as v
∞
AB,1 and
v∞AB,2 and denote the symplectic eigenvalue of VA|β in
7this limit as v∞A|β . We find these to be:
v∞AB,1 = 1 +
ϵ′η′
1− η′ , (26)
v∞AB,2 = µ
′(1− η′), (27)
v∞A|β =
2
η′
+ ϵ′ − 1. (28)
We calculate the mutual information between Alice
and Bob, I(α : β), as the reduction in (classical) entropy
of β when conditioned with α. The asymptotic limit of
this mutual information is equal to
I(α : β)∞ = H(Vβ + 1)−H(Vβ |α+ 1) (29)
= log2
η′µ′
η′ϵ′ + 2
, (30)
where H is the Shannon entropy [43] and Vβ (Vβ |α) is
the variance of Bob’s outcome β (conditional outcome
β|α). We then calculate the Holevo bound between Eve
and Bob in the asymptotic limit. We find:
I(E : β)∞ = log2
e v∞AB,2
2
+ Sconst, (31)
where
Sconst = g(v
∞
AB,1)− g(v∞A|β) (32)
is the entropy contribution that does not scale with µ.
The first term of this expression comes from the asymp-
totic form of g(v∞AB,2), as per Eq. (7). The asymptotic
secret key rate is given by the difference
K∞(n¯, η, ϵ) = I(α : β)∞ − I(E : β)∞ (33)
= log2
2η′
e(1− η′)(η′ϵ′ + 2) − Sconst. (34)
The extra information gained by Eve due to the side-
channel is the difference between the key rate with the
side-channel and the key rate without. In general, the
asymptotic key rate decreases as the effective transmis-
sion decreases (either due to an increase in the average
photon number of the side-channel mode or due to in-
creased line loss) and as the channel noise increases. This
is shown in the plots in Figs. 7 and 8.
The asymptotic secret key rate K∞ takes a particu-
larly simple form if the channel does not add any noise
(a pure-loss channel). In fact, it becomes
K∞lossy = −
log2 (1− η′)
η′
− log2 e (35)
=
2(n¯+ 1)
η
log2
[
1− η
2(n¯+ 1)
]
− log2 e. (36)
The rate K∞lossy is always positive and plotted in Fig. 7
for various mean photon numbers n¯, where it is also com-
pared with the ultimate point-to-point rate or PLOB
bound − log2(1 − η) [41]. Each time n¯ + 1 doubles (e.g.
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FIG. 7: Plots of the secret key rate (in logarithmic scale)
versus channel transmission η of the main quantum channel,
in the absence of excess noise (lossy channel rate). The top
curve is the PLOB bound [41], which is the secret key capacity
of the lossy channel, i.e., the maximum key rate achievable
over this channel by any point-to-point QKD protocol in the
absence of side-channels [42]. We then show the ideal rate of
the coherent state protocol [32] with no side channels. Lower
curves refer to the coherent state protocol in the presence of a
side-channel with an increasing number of photons n¯, ranging
from the leakage mode case (n¯ = 0) to more active hacking
(n¯ = 1, 3, 7). As we can see, the key rate is always positive
(for any value of n¯), but it quickly declines as n¯ increases.
when n¯ goes from 0 to 1, from 1 to 3 or from 3 to 7), the
key rate K∞lossy decreases by approximately 3 dB.
In the low transmission regime (i.e., long distances), it
is known that the PLOB bound becomes roughly linear
in η, and is approximately equal to η/ ln 2 ≃1.44η bits
per transmission. It is also known that, without side-
channels, the coherent state protocol has a long-distance
ideal rate of about η/(2 ln 2)≃0.72η bits per transmission,
which is half the PLOB bound. The linearity also holds
when we include the side channels. In fact, for low η, we
find that the key rate of Eq. (36) becomes
K∞lossy≃
η
4(n¯+ 1) ln 2
≃ 0.36
n¯+ 1
η . (37)
Note that with the leakage mode (n¯ = 0), this rate is half
that of the coherent state protocol without side-channels.
This rate keeps halving each time (n¯ + 1) doubles; this
can also be seen in the constant decrease in intercept
between each of the plots in Fig. 7.
We then calculate the threshold excess noise, ϵmax, for
a given channel transmission, η, and side-channel param-
eter, n¯. This is the value of the excess noise up to which
secret key distribution is possible. The threshold condi-
tion ϵmax = ϵ(η, n¯) is given by solving K
∞(k, η, ϵ) = 0.
In Fig. 8, we show the security threshold of the coherent
state protocol [32] without side-channels and, then, in
two cases with side-channel modes (n¯ = 0 and 1). The
shaded regions show the regions in which secret key dis-
tribution is possible for a given side-channel.
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FIG. 8: Security thresholds in terms of maximally-tolerable
excess noise versus channel transmission (in decibels). The
shaded regions are the regions in which secret key distribu-
tion is possible for a given side-channel. The boundaries of
the regions show the values of the excess noise at which se-
cret key distribution becomes impossible for a given transmis-
sion and side-channel. Adding the leakage mode side-channel
significantly decreases the tolerable excess noise for a given
transmission, and increasing the average photon number n¯ of
the side-channel further decreases it.
The leakage mode case (n¯ = 0) has a significantly lower
security threshold than the case with no side-channel,
and increasing the average photon number further de-
creases the threshold, for fixed transmission. For in-
stance, for channel transmission of 20 dB, the presence
of leakage (n¯ = 0) decreases the tolerable excess noise
by ≃ 0.06 (from about 0.12). For active hacking with
n¯ = 1 photon, we have a further decrease of ≃ 0.03. In
other words, a side-channel with n¯ = 1 gives a ≃ 75%
decrease in tolerable excess noise at this distance. If n¯ is
increased, the attack becomes even more powerful. It is
then important for Alice to be able to accurately measure
n¯, by characterising her devices as accurately as possible.
D. Generalisation of the side-channel
We can also consider a simple extension, in which Eve’s
side-channel mode is modulated by mα, whilst Alice’s
signal state is modulated by α. m is a multiplicative fac-
tor on the displacement of the Trojan state; m = 1 gives
the case that has already been considered. This setup is
shown in Fig. 9. Without loss of generality, we assume
that m > 0, since Eve can always apply a phase shift of
π to her modes. Similarly to the original m = 1 case,
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FIG. 9: This is an extension of the original setup (Fig. 1), in
which both the average number of photons entering Alice’s
device, n¯, and the modulation amplitude of the side-channel
mode, m, are monitored. Unlike in the original case, m does
not have to equal 1, and can take any real value. The dashed
red line marks the part of Alice’s device that is accessible to
Eve. The key rate for this setup can be calculated similarly
to the key rate for the original setup; the only difference is in
the expression for the k parameter, which affects the “effective
loss”, the “effective excess noise” and “effective modulation
amplitude”. See text for more explanation.
we can show that this attack is equivalent to a standard
attack against the main channel but with an “effective
modulation amplitude”, an “effective excess noise” and
an “effective loss”. As we show in the appendix, the
original and effective parameters are related by the same
Eqs. (21) and (22), but where k becomes the following
function of both n¯ and m [44]
k(n¯,m) =
√
m2(2n¯+ 1) + 1. (38)
By monitoring both n¯ and m, Alice can therefore fully
quantify the effect of any single mode side-channel of this
type. Alice can find n¯ by monitoring the average pho-
ton number entering her device. There are a number of
ways in which she could find m. For instance, she could
monitor the total average outgoing photon number of her
device across all modes.
III. CONCLUSIONS AND FURTHER
DISCUSSIONS
In this work we have considered the effects of hacking
Alice’s box in one-way CV QKD, namely the coherent
state protocol of Ref. [32], which is hacked while being
implemented over a thermal-loss quantum communica-
tion channel. We have assumed that a Trojan horse side-
channel mode is introduced in Alice’s device and is mod-
ulated in the same way as the signal state. Under this
condition, we have found how quickly the key rate of the
9original protocol is deteriorated by increasing the mean
number of photons n¯ inserted in the device. Even the
presence of a leakage mode (n¯ = 0) is able to halve the
rate. Then, each time the value of (n¯ + 1) doubles, the
long-distance key rate is further halved.
Then we have also considered a direct generalisation
of the basic side-channel attack where the Trojan horse
mode is modulated at a different amplitude (mα) than
the signal state. If this modulation is inefficient (m < 1),
then the attack is weaker than the basic one. However,
if m > 1, then the attack becomes more deleterious. In
order to deal with this situation, Alice should be able to
estimate not only the mean number of extra photons n¯
entering the device, but also the mean number of extra
photons leaving the device, so that she can also eval-
uate m. Therefore, it seems that quantum metrological
tools [45–51] are necessary inside Alice’s box, unless Eve’s
hacking is mitigated by other means which suitably mod-
ify the original setup and protocol.
If the modulator can be surrounded by a passive at-
tenuator, such that any photons not entering or leaving
via the main channel are highly attenuated, the effects
of any Trojan horse photons not entering via the main
channel can be greatly mitigated. The attenuator can
be modelled as a beamsplitting operation with a vacuum
mode. The effects on the information gained by Eve are
twofold: the first quadrature of her side-channel mode is
scaled down by the attenuation and the correlations be-
tween Eve’s Trojan horse mode and her idler mode are
reduced. The conditional state ψE1,E2|α received by Eve
after the side-channel (conditioned on Alice’s value), will
be a TMSV state with a lower photon number than the
incoming state and classical Gaussian noise added to the
idler state. If we denote the covariance matrix of this
state VE1,E2|α,
VE1,E2|α =
(
n¯′1
√
n¯′ − 1Z√
n¯′ − 1Z n¯1
)
(39)
=
(
n¯′1
√
n¯′ − 1Z√
n¯′ − 1Z n¯′1
)
⊕ a
(
0
1
)
, (40)
where n¯ is the initial photon number of the TMSV state
(prior to the side-channel), n¯′ is some positive, real num-
ber less than n¯ and a = (n¯−n¯′). If the Trojan horse mode
is modulated by mα, we can say that the first quadra-
ture of this mode after the attenuator is m′α, where m′
is some positive, real number less than m. Then, the key
rate is lower-bounded by the key rate calculated before,
but with n¯ and m replaced by n¯′ and m′ respectively.
More specifically, the expression for k in Eq. (38) be-
comes
k(n¯′,m′) =
√
m′2(2n¯′ + 1) + 1 (41)
=
√
Tm2(2T 2n¯′ + 1) + 1, (42)
where T is the transmission of the attenuator. This ex-
pression rapidly approaches unity as T decreases. Here
we have assumed that the Trojan horse state passes
through the attenuator twice: once prior to modula-
tion and once after modulation. Hence, we have set
m′ =
√
Tm and n¯′ = T 2n¯.
The expression for the maximum secret key rate in
this case is an upper bound: whilst the addition of Gaus-
sian noise to Eve’s idler mode cannot increase the Holevo
bound of her mutual information with Bob’s values, it is
not immediately obvious whether it in fact decreases it.
It is therefore not obvious whether this upper bound is
tight, or whether the power of the side-channel would be
even further reduced by the attenuation; this is a ques-
tion that is open to further study.
Without upper-bounding the incoming photon num-
ber, the addition of an attenuator does not provide prov-
able security by itself, since we do not know the initial
values of m and n¯, hence quantum metrological tools are
still required. It may be possible to find an upper-bound
on the incoming photon number for a given device, using
physical considerations, such as the point at which dam-
age to the modulator from the incoming photons would
become obvious to Alice.
In order to limit the effects of a Trojan horse mode in-
troduced via the main channel, the passive architecture
to limit Trojan horse attacks in the DV case, introduced
in [30], could be implemented in the CV case. The in-
coming photon number is bounded using the LIDT of the
optical fibre constituting the main quantum channel; the
photon number threshold is dependent on the frequency
of the incoming photons, since lower frequency photons
are less energetic, however the frequency is bounded from
below by an optical fibre loop and a filtering block, which
select for frequencies. There is then an attenuator, which
greatly reduces the photon number of any incoming state.
In this case, the attenuation will not decrease the mag-
nitude of modulation of the Trojan horse state compared
to the signal state, as it does in the case in which the
Trojan horse photons do not enter via the main chan-
nel. This is because the signal state will be attenuated in
the same way as the Trojan horse state. The incoming
photons sent by Eve would still be attenuated, leading
to damping of the off-diagonal elements of VE1,E2|α. By
suitably choosing the attenuation, bearing in mind the
maximum photon number of Eve’s Trojan horse state,
Alice could decrease the correlations between Eve’s Tro-
jan horse mode and her idler mode to an arbitrary degree,
and hence could effectively reduce Eve’s side-channel to
a leakage mode (n¯ = 0).
Bounding the incoming photon number using the
LIDT raises another issue, since we have assumed that
modulation of the signal mode is unbounded, and hence
can be taken to infinity. Since the photon number of
the signal state will also be limited by the LIDT, this
is not entirely true. However, if the LIDT is sufficiently
high, this should not greatly affect the secret key rate.
Increasing the LIDT does not increase the photon num-
ber of Eve’s outgoing side-channel mode as long as the
attenuation is raised accordingly.
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One further possible problem could occur if the atten-
uator itself is not properly characterised. If it re-radiates
absorbed photons, or scatters light in such a way that it
is accessible to Eve, the attenuator itself may provide a
leakage side-channel. Alternatively, it may have a much
higher transmission at certain frequencies, allowing Eve
to send Trojan horse photons through without much at-
tenuation.
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APPENDIX A: CALCULATION OF THE
K-VALUE FOR ANY M-VALUE
The steps to study the setup in Fig. 9 are very similar
to those for the m = 1 case. By using a beamsplitter on
modes 1 and 2 followed by two-mode squeezers on modes
2 and 3 and then on modes 1 and 3, we can show that
the setup is equivalent to one in which the signal state is
modulated by k1α and a single pure side-channel mode
is modulated by k2Zα (as in Fig. 2, but with different
values for k1 and k2). We then again use the fact that
this gives the same key rate as a setup in which the side-
channel mode is modulated by k2α instead of by k2Zα,
and hence that it gives the same key rate as one in which
the signal state is modulated by k =
√
k21 + k
2
2, with a
beamsplitter in the main channel.
We label the initial covariance matrix of the total
state as V m ̸=10 , the initial covariance matrix for fixed
α as V m ̸=10 |α and the initial quadratures for fixed α as
Xm ̸=10 |α, and then use the subscripts 1, 2 and 3 to denote
these objects after the beamsplitter, the first two-mode
squeezer and the second two-mode squeezer respectively.
The optical circuit is the same as in Fig. 3; only the pa-
rameters of the optical components are changed for the
m ̸= 1 case.
The first and second moments of the initial state are
Xm ̸=10 |α =

 αmα
0

 , (A1)
V m ̸=10 |α =

1 0 00 cosh 2r1 sinh 2rZ
0 sinh 2rZ cosh 2r1

 , (A2)
V m ̸=10 =

(µ+ 1)1 mµ1 0mµ1 (m2µ+ cosh 2r)1 sinh 2rZ
0 sinh 2rZ cosh 2r1

 .
(A3)
The first optical component is a beamsplitter that sets
the quadratures of modes 2 and 3 to 0 (moves the entire
displacement onto mode 1). This beamsplitter has angle
θm ̸=11 = arccos
1√
m2 + 1
, (A4)
and changes the first and second moments of the state to
Xm ̸=11 |α =


√
m2 + 1α
0
0

 , (A5)
V m ̸=11 |α =


m2 cosh 2r+1
m2+1 1
2m sinh2 r
m2+1 1 my
(1)
Z
2m sinh2 r
m2+1 1
m2+cosh 2r
m2+1 1 y
(1)
Z
my(1)Z y(1)Z cosh 2r1

 ,
(A6)
V m ̸=11 = V
m ̸=1
1 |α⊕ (m2 + 1)µ

1 0
0

 , (A7)
where y(1) = (sinh 2r)/
√
m2 + 1.
The next component purifies the second mode, re-
ducing the state to a bipartite state. It acts on the
second and third modes and has squeezing parameter
rm ̸=12 = − arcsinh
√
2 sinh r√
m2 cosh 2r+m2+2
. The first and sec-
ond moments become
Xm ̸=12 |α =


√
m2 + 1α
0
0

 , (A8)
V m ̸=12 |α =


m2 cosh 2r+1
m2+1 1 0 y
(2)
Z
0 1 0
y(2)Z 0 m
2 cosh 2r+1
m2+1 1

 , (A9)
V m ̸=12 = V
m ̸=1
2 |α⊕ (m2 + 1)µ

1 0
0

 , (A10)
where
y(2) =
√
2m sinh r
√
m2 cosh 2r +m2 + 2
m2 + 1
. (A11)
The final component unsqueezes the remaining two
modes, such that the state for fixed α is a vacuum state.
The squeezing parameter is rm ̸=13 = − arcsinh m sinh r√m2+1 .
The first and second moments become
Xm ̸=13 |α =


√
m2 cosh 2r+m2+2√
2
α
−m sinh rZα
0

 =

 km ̸=11 αkm ̸=12 Zα
0

 ,
(A12)
V m ̸=13 |α =
(
1 0
0 1
)
, V m ̸=13 =
(
x+1 y
(3)
Z
y(3)Z x−1
)
, (A13)
where
x± =
1
2
(m2µ cosh 2r ±m2µ+ 2), (A14)
y(3) = −mµ sinh r
√
m2 cosh 2r +m2 + 2√
2
. (A15)
Since we have shown that there is an optical circuit
that reversibly converts the initial state of the setup in
12
Fig. 9 to the initial state of the setup in Fig. 2, the two
setups must have the same secret key rate for the same
thermal noise. As shown in the main text, this also means
that the setup in Fig. 9 has the same secret key rate as the
side-channel-free setup with an “effective modulation” of
µeff = k2µ, an “effective channel loss” of ηeff = η
k2
and
an “effective excess noise” of ϵeff = k2ϵ, where
k =
√
k21 + k
2
2 (A16)
=
√
1
2
(m2 cosh 2r +m2 + 2) +m2 sinh2 r (A17)
=
√
m2(2n¯+ 1) + 1. (A18)
This is the result given in the main text.
